(from its meeting on November 3, 1998,

1

Final Report of the Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry

The Emergency and Protective Services Committee reports, for the information of Council, having:

Recommendations:

The Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry on October 27, 1998, recommended to the Emergency and Protective Services Committee and Council that the report (October 7, 1998) from the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services be adopted subject to the following amendments:

The Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry also reports having:

Background:

The Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry had before it the following report and communications:

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The following persons appeared before the Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry in connection with the foregoing matter:

(Report dated October 7, 1998, addressed to the

Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry from the

Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services)

Purpose:

This report presents an overview of the review of the Toronto Taxicab Industry as conducted by the Toronto Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry. As such, the report serves as the executive summary to the attached detailed report entitled "Report to Review the Toronto Taxi Industry", that provides the analysis to support the recommended reforms.

This executive summary addresses the extent of research and analyses conducted, describes the study methodology, provides an overview of the feedback received through deputations, submissions and workshops, and describes the conclusions and recommendations for reforms to the taxi industry.

Funding Sources, Financial Implications and Impact Statement:

There are operating cost implications to Toronto Licensing due to changes in administrative procedures and resources that result from this study. Specifically, a requirement for ten additional enforcement staff is identified and requires an increase in the amount of approximately $800,000.00 for staff and equipment, in Toronto Licensing’s 1999 operating budget. Once these recommendations are implemented, it is expected that the quality of the taxicab industry will improve and demand for enforcement will decline. Other implications related to increased training and complaints handling requirements will become evident as the recommendations are implemented and will impact future budgets in the year 2000 and beyond. It is recommended that these impacts be reported to the Emergency and Protective Services Committee and Council within six months of approval of this report.

The current practice requires Toronto Licensing to recover operating costs through annual licensing fees allocated proportionately to each industry that it regulates. The changes recommended in this report are for the benefit of taxi licensees and it is therefore recommended that any budget increase be offset by an increase to the license fees paid by taxi service licensees. Recognizing the timing of this report, the proposed improvements to the taxicab industry will be additional to the license fees 1999 taxicab license fees already approved by Council at its meeting on October 1 and 2, 1998, as contained in Clause No. 2 of Report No. 9 of the Emergency and Protective Services Committee. This approval provides for taxicab licenses to be issued for a period of eight months in 1999. Therefore, impacts on Licensing fees that result from the recommendations in this report can be incorporated into the calculations for the next license period for taxicab license.

The recommended reforms also impact the current market value of taxicab licenses, lease rates for taxicabs, and income for drivers. These changes are designed to be implemented gradually so that the impact on individuals can be appropriately managed. These changes are necessary and will serve to benefit the Toronto public and visitors and the taxi industry overall.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

(d) all Standard License owners must participate in the industry by:

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(19) Council endorse the continuation of the Taxicab Advisory Committee (TAC);

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Council Reference/Background/History:

At its meeting on April 16, 1998, by adoption of Clause No. 2 of Report No. 3 of the Emergency and Protective Services Committee, Council established a Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry. The creation of this Task Force was the culmination of a number of recent articles in the media and the concerns expressed by the public, taxicab owners and drivers, Toronto Licensing, the Board of Trade and the tourism industry respecting the state of the taxi industry in Toronto.

These concerns include:

Council approved the following guiding principles for the Task Force:

At its meeting on May 11, 1998, the Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry adopted the report entitled "Work Plan for the Task Force". The report described the resources, tasks and timelines involved in reviewing the Toronto taxi industry, consulting with stakeholders, and developing recommendations. The work plan consists of three phases, namely: research and scoping of issues, analysis and consultation, and report and recommendations.

At its meeting on June 22, 1998, the Task Force adopted the report entitled "Status of the Review of the Toronto Taxi Industry" for information. The report provided a summary of the deputations received from stakeholders and presented the status of the review of the taxicab industry, including an overview of issues and a summary of possible solutions. It addressed the structure for the workshops held on July 6, 1998, that were designed to gain feedback from various participants in the Toronto taxicab industry. The report also more clearly defined the goals of the Task Force, namely to ensure that the Toronto Taxicab industry:

Comments and/or Discussion and/or Justification:

The Toronto taxicab industry needs major improvement. Too often its passengers suffer from a ride in an inferior vehicle with poor quality service. Customer complaints are common and severe, as many passengers perceive a dilapidated taxicab as an unsafe taxicab. In too many cases, this perception may be reality: at any one time, an estimated 70 taxicabs are serving the public while in dangerous and unsafe condition. Many passengers describe an intolerable lack of comfort and a complete lack of customer service. This situation is an unacceptable, negative reflection on the image of the City of Toronto as a world class city. Taxicabs must be ambassadors for our City of Toronto.

The problems of the industry have been blamed on bad or unenforceable rules in the By-law, poor enforcement of the By-law, and to the structure and temperament of the industry itself

Overcoming these problems, and providing high quality service to the customer is the goal of the this report. The 50 recommendations are organized around five points:

1. Create a Taxicab Passenger Bill of Rights: to focus the industry on customer service;

2. Improve the Cabs: retire dilapidated cabs and replace with newer, quality vehicles;

4. Create Ambassador class cabs: to put greater pride of ownership behind the wheel; and

5. Strengthen Enforcement: to make sure it all happens.

Every recommendation is an integral part to an overall plan designed to improve the taxicab industry. It is critical to approve these recommendations as a package rather than piecemeal, as the expected positive impacts on the industry will not be realized by isolated measures. Some recommendations directly address the quality of vehicles and training requirements, while others address issues less obvious to the public such as regulations and structure of the industry.

The poor existing state of the industry has evolved over 30 years and no fair and reasonable reform can transform it into a customer-based service overnight. Countless studies in the past have not been implemented for various reasons or change has been ineffective. As a result, the industry continues to decline. In addition, many industry stakeholders are frustrated and demoralized, with customers paying the ultimate price with poor service.

There have been some heartening, isolated improvements in the industry in recent months. But we take them not as a comfort that the industry will self-improve and that no change is necessary, but rather as confirmation of how positive change can be. Efforts by the industry to participate in this process and introduce better quality vehicles for example, are applauded. It is evidence that the Toronto taxicab industry is determined to improve. This is a signal of support that the time for change is now to secure a successful and respected future for Toronto taxicab industry participants.

The proposals contained in this report will bring immediate, visible improvement to the taxi industry. In the first year alone, Torontonians would see the retirement of all cabs over eight model years old. That’s approximately 50 per cent of the fleet upgraded in 1999, (1,738 taxicabs). By the year 2002, all Toronto taxicabs would be no more than five model years old. At the same time, continuous improvements in training for all drivers and owners would lead to discernible improvements in service and driver knowledge. These changes would have an immediate positive impact from the back seat view in a taxicab.

Industry Background:

The Taxi industry is governed by the Toronto Licensing, and By-law 20-85. A taxi may not be put on the road unless it is licensed by Toronto Licensing. Similarly, no one may drive a cab except a Toronto Licensing approved driver. The holder of a cab license may:

Only about 20 per cent of owners drive their own plate. About 60 per cent of drivers hire a middleman-manager, known as a "designated agent" to operate the plate on their behalf. The remaining 20 per cent lease the plate to a driver directly, without a designated agent.

The number of taxicab licenses is strictly limited. Drivers’ licences have traditionally been relatively easy to obtain. This has resulted in a relative over-supply of drivers for the number of available plates. There are well over 10,000 licensed taxi-cab drivers for the 3,480 licensed taxicabs on the road in Toronto. Cabs tend to be driven in two twelve-hour shifts, so there are roughly three drivers for every possible taxi shift.

New plates are issued based on a formula which projects demand for taxi services. Toronto Licensing maintains waiting lists for owners and drivers for new plates. At present, these two lists combined are over 2,500 names long. No new taxicab licenses have been issued since 1992, although had the model been applied from the freeze in 1993 to today, 233 new licenses would have been issued.

Drivers say that the over-supply of drivers allows owners to command "take it or leave it prices" for plate leases. Owners are quick to point out they only charge what the market will bear, and that no one is forced to remain a cab driver. Many drivers claim that that they feel compelled to continue driving even if their returns are low, because they must continue to drive to keep their name on waiting list for a new plates.

The market price of owner’s licenses has grown in recent years: from $49,976.00 in 1993 to $85,000.00 in 1998. Income derived from leasing provides an annual average rate of return of 13 per cent. This is a spread of 8 per cent over the returns from standard investment options, such as Canada Savings Bonds.

The Taxicab Passenger Bill of Rights:

It is apparent that it is necessary to change the culture of Toronto’s Taxi Industry. The focus needs to change to customer service. This can be promoted by setting clear performance standards that the City of Toronto expects in its cabs.

The Taxicab Passenger Bill of Rights was a concept introduced in New York as part of the sweeping reforms brought to New York’s cab industry. It has had a major effect in refocusing industry priorities and in raising consumer expectations. This report recommends the adoption of the New York Bill of Rights with minor amendments: for example, as much emphasis is put on heating as on air conditioning, given the realities of the Toronto winter.

It is believed that the Bill of Rights will be the benchmark against which developments in the industry will be tested. In that sense, it is the centrepiece of the report. All the other recommendations serve as a means of giving effect to the service standards contained within it.

Better Taxicabs:

There are not as many new cabs on the road as there used to be. In 1982 over 80 per cent of cabs were less than three years old. Now, only 20 per cent of Toronto’s cabs are less than three years old.

Similarly, the retirement age of cabs is getting older. Until 1992, all cabs were retired at the end of their sixth model year. Many argued that if age extensions were permitted, then the fleet would be improved because owners would put better cars on the road. In reality, it did not work that way. In 1998, over 50 per cent of the cabs are over eight years old and maintenance violations have gone up since 1992.

On average, 2 per cent of vehicles fail their scheduled inspections and are found to be "dangerous and unsafe" That figure translates to roughly 70 taxicabs.

Of greater concern, in a recent spot check performed by Toronto Licensing, 14 out of 21 cabs inspected were removed from service as "dangerous and unsafe". Clearly, there is a problem of vehicle quality that must be addressed.

At present, cabs may be no more than three years old when they enter service, and are retired at the end of six years. They are eligible for age extensions beyond six years, however, when they can pass a mechanical inspection.

The report recommends that taxicabs be no more than one model year old when they come into service and that they be retired at the end of their fifth model year. It is recommended that these new age restrictions be phased in over five years. It is also recommended that age extensions be made available for two years where the vehicle has been fitted for natural gas or for provided handicapped accessibility features. No other extensions shall be offered.

Better Training:

The skills of the driver are as important as the vehicle in providing a safe and comfortable trip for the consumer. It is believed that it is necessary to make sure that drivers have the skills necessary to provide exceptional customer service.

Toronto Licensing has recently adopted a three-week training course for drivers, but the overwhelming majority of license holders got their license before it was instituted. They obtained their license on the basis of a three day course. While on-the-job training has been their classroom, there are changes in the industry that require on-going training.

Accordingly, the report recommends that all drivers take three-day refresher course every two years. The course would cover changes in the By-law, developments in tourism, defensive driving and customer service. It is also recommended that drivers who fail the current three-day course be required to take the current three-week course to maintain their license. Training is not only important for drivers. Owners and designated agents also need to maintain their skills, particularly given how many owners are not active in the industry on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, an annual five-day course is proposed for all owners and designated agents.

Ambassador Class Taxicabs:

The issuing of new taxicab plates is probably the most controversial aspect of the industry. The limit on plates creates a closed market. The number of cab licenses determines how many ways Toronto’s Taxi "pie gets sliced". Adding new plates adds new mouths to feed, so industry concern over new plates is understandable.

The matter should also be of concern to the City. The issuance of new licenses should not merely grow the industry, but also grow it in a way that promotes the health of the industry.

The report makes two key recommendations:

The first relates to how we issue plates. The second relates to the characteristics of the new plates. Together, the recommendations are designed to ensure that new entrants to the taxi industry will offer a high quality service that we will be proud to have as Ambassadors for Toronto.

First: how we issue new plates. This report recommends that over time, the City should move away from the existing system whereby an economic model determines when new plates should be issued.

Instead, the City should draw from the London, England model, whereby new participants may enter the industry after making an investment in customer service. In London, this investment takes the form of passing a notoriously difficult test – an investment of about two years of the applicant’s time. A two year course does not appear to be necessary in Toronto’s case: the City is simply not that complicated. Nevertheless, there needs to be a legitimate barrier to entry to prevent the market from being flooded with cabs.

This report recommends that the barrier should not be absolute, as at present, but rather permeable. The City should facilitate individuals who want to make the necessary investment to get into the industry.

Secondly, the barrier should promote the health of the industry by leading to a positive investment in the skills and tools of the prospective cab driver.

Accordingly, two components are recommended:

Initially, it is recommended that licences be issued on this basis to a maximum of 300 licences per year. Over time, however, it is recommended that numeric limits be abandoned in favour of the modified London model.

The second recommendation relates to the characteristics of taxicab licenses. The problem with issuing new licenses of the existing kind is that it provides an economic windfall to the recipient, with no corresponding benefit to the public. The plate is issued at a cost of roughly $6,000.00, but soon is saleable at a market value approaching $85,000.00-$90,000.00. Furthermore, the right to lease the plate means that the new owner may soon cease directly serving the public.

Analysis reveals that owner-drivers are the least likely drivers to have complaints made against them for poor vehicle maintenance or bad service. This is attributed to two factors. First, an owner-driver is his or her own boss, and operates without the burden of lease costs or other layers of management. With fewer expenses to pay, the owner driver has more money to channel into vehicle maintenance. Secondly, it appears that the positive influence of pride of ownership translates into better cars and a more consistent, higher level of customer service.

Unfortunately, the number of owner-drivers is in decline. While they made up the majority of the industry in the 1970’s, today they make up about 20 per cent of cab drivers. The recommendations in this report promote the existence of the owner-driver in the industry, is to promote the industry itself.

Accordingly, this report recommends that all new plates be issued with the following stipulations:

This would ensure that new plate owners would be owner-drivers.

Existing plates would be grandfathered under current regulations, with one exception: After two years from implementation, plates could only be sold to purchasers with a valid taxi driver’s licence.

Enforcement:

Experience in the taxi industry has shown that vigorous enforcement is necessary to uphold the provisions of the By-law. This report recommends that action be taken to ensure that the public interest is upheld.

First, it is recommended that amendments be made to the By-law and to the Municipal Act to allow for more aggressive enforcement. For example, in order to charge an unlicensed taxicab, enforcement officers must witness money change hands. Passengers are often understandably reluctant to serve as a witness and attend a hearing. As a result, it is often impossible to successfully prosecute an offence when it is caught by enforcement staff. This requirement often renders the offence effectively unenforceable. Enforcement problems are exacerbated by the requirement that the Commission must base any penalty on their judgement whether the individual will offend in the future. Further, the Municipal Act does not currently provide for the institution of minimum penalties for guilty offences. All of these factors make vigorous enforcement a challenge. The report makes specific recommendations for amendments that will enhance the ability of the City to enforce the By-law.

Secondly, the report recommends that more resources be put into enforcement. There has been an overall decrease in enforcement resources for the taxicab industry caused by staff reductions and workload increase. This facilitates a culture that openly contravenes the By-law. Many participants choose to offend as the risk of penalty is limited. The report recommends that ten new enforcement officers be hired to increase enforcement activity in the industry.

Finally, it is believed that in the future, the industry should take a greater role in managing itself. It is recommended that the Taxi Advisory Committee be reconstituted as an elected body, with a mandate to work with Toronto Licensing to develop ways and means of achieving greater industry self-management over the next five years.

Conclusion:

The simple issuance of more licenses will not improve the quality of the industry to the degree necessary. It may be argued that the improvement to vehicle quality and driver training is all that is required. It is more likely, however, that the existing structure, even with additional plates, will lead to an eventual absence of owner-drivers and a continued decline in customer service. The challenge is to propose a solution that improves quality for passengers and provides fair returns for drivers and owners within a regulatory structure that works effectively. We believe that this plan meets the challenge.

While this report is critical of many practices common in the industry, the criticisms do not apply to everyone in it. There are many individuals – owners, drivers and designated agents – who have impressed us by their commitment to good business and good customer service. We believe that they, their peers and their customers know who they are, and we applaud them for maintaining high standards in an often frustrating system.

The real message of this report is that taxicabs are ambassadors to our visitors and residents. We must impose high expectations on the taxicab industry to leave a positive impression on the City of Toronto. This can only be achieved if all stakeholders work together towards this common goal.

(A copy of the detailed report (October 1998) entitled "Report to Review the Toronto Taxi Industry" and the Financial Analysis attached to the foregoing report was circulated to all Members of Council with the agenda for the meeting of the Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry held October 27, 1998, and is on file in the Office of the City Clerk.)

Purpose:

The purpose of this report is to respond to requests made by members of the Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry respecting the report submitted by staff to the Task Force on the review. These issues deal with increasing the number of accessible taxicabs for the disabled, ambassador plates, plate issuance, responsibility of brokerages for taxicabs, and training.

Funding Sources, Financial Implications and Impact Statement:

There are no financial implications related to this report.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

Council Reference/Background/History:

_The Task Force to Review the Taxi Industry on October 27, 1998, requested the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services to report to the Emergency and Protective Services Committee on the following:

_____________________ò_!!`_1_____ that 10 per cent of the new ambassador licenses be accessible to the disabled;

_____________________ò_!!`_1_____ staff be requested to consider additional incentives to the establishment of accessible taxis;

_____________________ò_!!`_1_____ the feasibility of converting all plates to ambassador plates over a 10-year period; and

The following motion was also referred for a report to the Emergency and Protective Services Committee:

"Moved by Councillor Fotinos that:

Comments and/or Discussion and/or Justification:

Accessible Taxicabs:

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Accessible taxicabs are an important component to the Toronto transportation system for the disabled. There are two key issues respecting accessible taxicabs; quality of service, and availability of service.

With respect to quality of service, a number of individuals indicate that many drivers are not sensitive to the special service needs of the disabled. Concerns range from some drivers refusing to service individuals with guide dogs, not properly securing wheelchairs, and not providing assistance. The taxicab training and retraining programs recommended in the review will include specific training respecting services for disabled passengers to ensure that they are treated with dignity and respect.

With respect to availability of service, transportation options for many disabled individuals are limited to Wheeltrans service provided by the TTC and the taxi industry. While many disabled passengers can be served by the standard taxicab fleet, there are a number of individuals who require special vehicles, converted for wheelchair access. For these individuals, the issue is availability of service, not just the quality of service.

Current Accessible Taxicab Service:

Currently there are 32 accessible taxicabs in Toronto, 25 of which are under contract to six brokerages with Wheeltrans. Passengers using the Wheeltrans contracted taxicabs are in effect, subsidized, as registered passengers pay the regular TTC fare to the taxicab driver that is reimbursed to Wheeltrans. The brokerage is then paid a flat rate of $2.54 per kilometer, with the distance determined by Wheeltrans operational maps.

Accessible taxicab transportation funded by Wheeltrans is only available to registered passengers by booking a day in advance. Passengers may call a brokerage for service by one of the remaining 7 accessible taxicabs, but are obliged to pay the regular taxicab fare rate. One operator of accessible taxicabs indicates that without the subsidized Wheeltrans contracts, accessible taxicabs are not individually profitable. They further advise that the high demand for service and limited supply of vehicles generally requires pre-booking by passengers.

This view is supported by a financial analysis that reveals that vehicles are substantially more expensive, both from a capital and maintenance perspective. The capital cost of an accessible taxicab is approximately $50,000 - $55,000. The cost will vary depending on the characteristics of the taxicab. Maintenance cost will also vary but required hydraulic systems and the extra weight on the structure of the vehicles causes additional wear and tear.

Any current taxicab license holder can provide accessible taxicab service, as there is currently no differentiation in the license itself. The low number of privately available accessible taxicabs is likely the result of:

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An analysis of the privately operated accessible taxicab suggests that even if the license were acquired for free, fare revenues would have to be a minimum of 50-60% higher to be as equally well-off as a taxicab operating under a standard lease arrangement. Therefore, even if accessible taxicab licenses were offered for free, with no annual license renewal fee, it is unlikely that an individual driver would choose to provide this type of service.

Future Plans:

The Wheeltrans 5-year Accessible Plan was approved by the TTC and Metro Council in 1997 and calls for an increase in accessible taxicabs from 25 in 1998 to 73 in the year 2002 as indicated in Figure 1. The projections are based on 3% annual growth in the demand for accessible taxicab service. It should be noted that the TTC collective agreement currently limits peak service by accessible taxicabs to 25 taxis. This agreement expires on April 30, 1999.

Figure 1

Solution:

Under current provisions, accessible taxicabs are not financially viable for individual operators. Recognizing that Ambassador Taxicabs are intended to be owner-operated, it is difficult to devise a fair system to allocate 10% of licenses that will be accessible. The industry structure also does not support allocating a percentage of owned licenses that must be accessible. Since in most cases, fleets are not owned by brokerage companies, it is not practical to set a percentage of each fleet that must be accessible.

Incentives:

Although it is possible to create a special class of taxicab for accessible services, it would be required to provide a distinctive service from the standard taxicabs. Federal and Provincial grants to support conversion of accessible taxicabs were eliminated a number of years ago and the City cannot support business through grants or other means. The recommendations for reform to the taxicab industry also call for a 2-year extension to the life of vehicles converted for accessibility.

It appears that the preferred incentive is currently provided through the Wheeltrans contracts that offer a means of profit for taxicab owners. This system seems to work, although there is a shortage in supply. The Wheeltrans 5-Year Accessible Plan identifies this need and presents a reasonable plan to expand the fleet of accessible taxicabs. Therefore it is recommended that the increase in the number of taxicabs accessible to the disabled be achieved by increasing the number of accessible taxicabs contracted by Wheeltrans, from 25 taxicabs to 73 taxicabs by 2002, as provided for in the Wheeltrans 5-Year Accessible Plan approved by the TTC and the former Metro Council in 1997. It is also recommended that the Emergency and Protective Services Committee refer this report to Wheeltrans and encourage the implementation of the 5-Year Accessible Plan.

There may be other opportunities and ideas that the taxicab industry, in consultation with representatives of the disabled, can offer to increase service by accessible taxicabs. It is also recommended that this report be referred to the CAO to ensure that the Terms of Reference to be developed for the Taxicab Advisory Committee include as a priority, other means or incentives to increase the number of accessible taxicabs or improve taxicab service for the disabled.

Conversion to Ambassador Plates:

The conversion of all plates to Ambassador plates would result in the elimination of leasing and the complete devaluing of existing plates. The Ambassador license is premised on the concept of pride of ownership and the operation of the taxicab by an individual who has completed an advanced training program. As such, Ambassador licenses cannot be sold or leased. The financial impacts are shown in Appendix 1 to this report. Generally, returns for current taxicab license holders would diminish over a 10-year period until the lease and sale of licenses is phased out. Although a fleet of owner-operated Ambassador taxicabs offers benefits respecting quality of service, this approach would not meet all of the principles established for the Task Force in that it would not provide a fair return on investment for current taxicab license owners.

Responsibilities of Brokerages:

Brokerages are licensed by the City to provide dispatch services for the taxicab industry. As such, it is reasonable to consider methods that will increase their accountability for taxicabs operating within individual brokerages. Brokerages should have some responsibility for taxicabs they dispatch and also for the quality of the car that provides service as part of their business. Currently, responsibility for taxicabs is assigned to the owner and the driver.

The mechanisms that may be available to increase responsibilities and accountabilities for brokerages is a complex issue and would require a review of the existing license provisions. Before recommendations are made in this regard, consideration must be given to implications on enforcement, impact on the perceived decrease of responsibility for the taxicab on behalf of individual owners and drivers, and the ability of the Licensing Tribunal to impose meaningful penalties. It is therefore recommended that the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services report to the Emergency and Protective Services Committee within six months on how brokerages can be made to accept greater responsibility and accountability for taxis within their brokerages.

Training:

The approach to design and implement a training program for the Ambassador Taxicab licenses through the issuance of an RFP is in accordance with standard procedures of the City. The options for providing this training program are varied and range from individual colleges, many colleges, or other training providers. A direct arrangement, without a public process, may eliminate reasonable options. Specific program requirements, including the need to implement training in 1999 can be specified in the RFP document. Therefore, the RFP process is supported as the best approach.

The training of all owners, drivers, and designated agents within two years of the time they are offered presents three issues for consideration – the impact on Ambassador taxicabs, the impact on existing plate holders, and the practicality of training a more than 10,000 people within two years.

The Ambassador training program is designed to ensure that taxicab drivers who operate an Ambassador taxicab are committed to the industry. In addition to developing skills of taxicab drivers, the training program serves as a barrier to receiving a taxicab license. The incentive for drivers under the Ambassador program to take the expanded training program is the opportunity to operate their own taxicab business. With limited opportunity for drivers within the current structure, many may choose not to complete an extensive training program. One option is to open the opportunity for training with the proviso that the existing list will be used to continue to issue Ambassador licenses at the rate of 300 annually. The general public will benefit from improved customer service and taxicab drivers will know with absolute certainty when they will receive a plate of their own. Further, growth in the taxicab industry will remain controlled. The impact on the Ambassador Taxicab program would need to be considered further before recommendations can be made respecting expanded training.

Requiring individuals to successfully complete training in order to have their license renewed contradicts the objectives for grandfathering existing licenses. It is also not clear whether training can be mandated as a requirement for license renewal. The City Solicitor would need to review this proposal in more detail to determine the legal feasibility. Such action may force individuals to sell their licenses if they don’t successfully complete the training program. The proposed reforms suggest a program of retraining for all owners, drivers, and designated agents to ensure that they are continuously upgrading their skill and made aware of changes in the City and the taxicab industry.

With respect to implementing extensive training of all taxicab participants, there are currently more than 10,000 drivers and owners in the taxicab industry. Extensive resources would be required to train that many individuals within two years. If necessary, requirements could be included in the RFP document to determine how the training field could respond to such a large, short-term demand.

Issue of Licenses by Formula:

The continued issuance of licenses by use of the Coopers and Lybrand formula is not supported as it will perpetuate the problem that occurs within the existing taxicab industry. With respect to the Coopers and Lybrand formula itself, the financial analysis reveals that it underestimates growth in demand. Financial projections completed by City staff indicate that between 200-220 Ambassador licenses would have to be issued every year just to meet growth in demand and hold plate values and lease rates at current levels.

If 233 licenses are issued over the next 2 years, and the formula is followed on an annual basis with an estimated annual issuance of 40 licenses, plate values will climb to between $133,000 and $164,00 within ten years, and lease rates to between $1,400 and $1,700 per month, as shown in Appendix 2.

This option does not provide any means to ensure that drivers receive a fair return for their labour, and as such, does not meet all of the principles established for the Task Force.

Ambassador Taxicabs:

It is important to consider the recommended reforms as a package in order to ensure that all of the principles established for the Task Force are met. As noted above, the implementation of the recommended reforms without the new Ambassador licenses will not meet all of the principles established for the Task Force. It is also likely that without opportunity for drivers, the level of customer service will not substantially improve.

The process in developing this plan was open for consultation including the Taxicab Advisory Committee. It is therefore the position of the staff team that the recommendations, including the Ambassador licenses, should be approved now to ensure that the reforms meet the needs of the taxicab industry as defined by the principles established.

The Emergency and Protective Services Committee reports, for the information of Council, having also had before it the following communications/submissions:

________

The following persons appeared before the Emergency and Protective Services Committee in connection with the foregoing matter:

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Recovery of Costs for Ambulance Service Delivery into

Purpose:

To advise Council of its options for the recovery of the cost of cross-border ambulance service to the Regions of Peel, York, Durham and Halton. In the absence of inter-regional agreements, new Ontario Regulations provide for the ability of individual municipalities to bill regions directly for such costs, using a specific billing formula.

Funding Sources, Financial Implications and Impact Statement:

The process of billing of regions for cross-border ambulance service will result in the creation of revenues for Toronto Ambulance and/or the City of Toronto. Based on the pricing formula established under Ontario Regulation 354/98, net revenues of approximately $590 thousand are potentially available, based on the assumption that cross-border demand for service in 1998 is similar to actual demand in 1997.

Recommendations:

"It is recommended that:

Council Reference/Background/History:

Toronto Ambulance remains a substantial provider of service to the surrounding regional municipalities. Under the Ambulance Act of Ontario, no request for service into an adjoining region can be refused or redirected by Toronto Ambulance. Consequently, the City bears the cost of maintaining the staff and equipment required to meet these requests.

Similarly, though, there are occasions when ambulance service providers from the surrounding regions will deliver service within Toronto’s borders. On a net basis, however, Toronto Ambulance provides approximately twice as much cross-border service than it receives (in 1997 it responded to over 5650 calls in the combined GTA regions, while GTA services responded to just under 2900 calls in Toronto).

On January 1, 1998, the full funding and operation of ambulance services was downloaded from the Ministry of Health to upper tier municipalities, including the City of Toronto. Through Bill 152, the Province provides for the creation of inter-local agreements for compensation for the cost of ambulance services provided by adjacent municipalities to each other. Subsequently, Ontario Regulation 492/87 was amended as O. Regulation 354/98 to provide an explicit pricing formula for such services where such inter-local agreements are absent, or cannot be mutually developed.

Comments and/or Discussion and/or Justification:

Staff from Toronto Ambulance have, earlier this year, held meetings with representatives of the surrounding regional municipalities for the purposes of discussing cross-border service and billing matters (as well, Toronto Ambulance has offered consultations on the development and operation of emergency medical services systems to the regions, and to other various representatives of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario). Up to that point no formal billing agreements had been attempted or struck. While the Ambulance Act allowed for adjacent municipalities to establish billing agreements, it did not offer any direct dispute resolution process for situations where municipalities could not come to a satisfactory billing arrangement.

At the same time, the four regions did not then and do not yet have in place a formalized mechanism to deal with matters related to cross-border billing, since the regions are themselves still exploring the issues related to delivery of ambulance services within their communities. As a consequence there have been delays in being able to create official jurisdictional agreements.

Recently, the Ministry of Health amended the Regulations to allow for municipalities to directly bill the municipalities adjacent to them, where no formal billing agreements exist.

In Toronto Ambulance’s 1998 budget submissions, revenues of $350,000 were anticipated for cross-border service delivery. However, the current Regulatory formula now provides for the return of significantly higher revenues for the City of Toronto, in the range of $590,000. Amended estimates based on the provincial pricing formula follow.

If these revenue targets are to be met, Toronto Ambulance and/or the City itself requires agreements with the regions of Peel, York, Durham and Halton in order to establish a mechanism for the reconciliation of these costs, and recovery or payment of any net amounts billable. In the absence of such agreements, Toronto Ambulance and/or the City requires authorization to submit bills to the four GTA regional governments under the provisions of O. Regulation 354/98.

There also exists an opportunity for the City of Toronto to explore other revenue return opportunities with the four GTA municipal regions, in such areas as disaster resource and contingency preparation. For example, the City of Toronto has historically provided emergency disaster and large incident responses to areas outside Toronto. It may now find itself able to ‘bill’ for the availability or actual use of these resources, based on a fee schedule separate from routine cross-border billing agreements.

Based on complete figures for 1997, the following table demonstrates estimates of the revenues and payables likely to arise from operations during 1998. Actuals for 1998 will be determined at year-end. For the purpose of these calculations, the formula provided in Regulation 354/98 is used, which yields an average cost of an ambulance call for Toronto Ambulance of $214. The same figure is used for the adjacent regional services, in the absence of more precise cost-per-call information from them. This assumption produces a conservative estimate of net revenues available to the City of Toronto, as ambulance wage rates (and therefore the costs-per-call) are lower in the adjacent regions.

Revenue Estimate Table:

The present Ambulance Act of Ontario has made legislative provisions for the downloading of ambulance services from the Province to municipalities. Some of these allow for a transition period, whereby municipalities have the option of not having to assume immediate responsibility for the operation of their own ambulance services. Municipalities can wait until the latter part of 1999 before they have to declare how their service will be provided, and by whom. Full responsibility for service provision takes place effective January 1, 2000. In the meantime, though, municipalities are responsible for the full funding of their ambulance services.

In the meantime, for those municipalities who are electing not to declare their model of service provision, the Ministry of Health is continuing to provide direct ambulance service delivery, but is billing back the costs to the municipalities being served. To this date, each of the four regional municipalities surrounding Toronto have not committed to assuming immediate responsibility for service delivery. As Toronto Ambulance (through the CAO and the Commissioner) commences discussions regarding cross-border billing agreements, it may well enter into financial negotiations through the Ministry, as the rovider of service to the regions. These agreements, if established, will expire January 1, 2000, and any agreements thereafter will be directly with the regions.

Conclusions:

Significant net revenues are owed to the City of Toronto for the provision of ambulance service to the surrounding municipalities. In turn, and by extension, the City owes each of the municipalities monies for ambulance services rendered within Toronto. Reconciliation of the cost of these services is now provided for under the Ambulance and its Regulations.

The City is in a position of now being able to formally approach each of the four GTA regions to initiate the process of establishing cross-border billing agreements. In the absence of such agreements, the City is in a position of being able to bill for services anyway, based on billing formulas introduced by the Ministry. The potential net revenue to Toronto is in the range of $590,000. In addition, the City can explore other potential service billing and/or fee-for-service arrangements in such areas as disaster response.

Contact Name:

Ron Kelusky

397-9240 Fax: 392-2115

3

Public Access Defibrillation (PAD)

The Emergency and Protective Services Committee reports, for the information of Council, having requested:

Purpose:

To inform Council of the benefits of public access defibrillation and improved cardiac care and response within the City of Toronto, and the requirements for the implementation of automatic defibrillation in City Hall and Nathan Phillips Square.

Financial Implications:

The initial cost of acquiring three automatic defibrillators for the City Hall project is approximately $15,000.00. Funds for the acquisition of the defibrillators for this initial City of Toronto program will be reallocated from the Division’s 1998 operating budget, and any impacts from the reallocation will be monitored in case of an unfavourable variance at year’s end.

In addition, the cost of training, periodic recertification and medical oversight will be provided from existing funds of Toronto Ambulance. Should Council elect to expand the placement of defibrillators in other City of Toronto owned buildings (e.g. Community Council buildings), additional program costs would be required and would be detailed in a future report. The City of Toronto would not be responsible for any costs for public access defibrillation programs initiated by private organizations in their facilities.

Recommendations:

"It is recommended that:

Council Reference/Background/History:

At its meeting on October 2, 1998, Toronto Council approved Clause 1 of Report No. 9 of the Emergency and Protective Services Committee, titled "Public Access Defibrillation Program". The report recommended:

• the reaffirmation of Council’s support of a Public Access Defibrillation Program within the City of Toronto;
• that the renovations to the Toronto City Hall incorporate the installation of automatic defibrillators in appropriate locations in City Hall and Nathan Phillips Square;
• that the appropriate staff be trained in the use of automatic defibrillators; and
• that the program be implemented by January 1, 1999.

In addition, the Emergency and Protective Services Committee requested a report regarding the feasibility of a Public Access Defibrillation pilot project in public buildings, statistics on the number of people who would benefit from PAD, and appropriate medical control.

Comments and/or Discussion and/or Justification:

The placement of automatic defibrillators to provide public access defibrillation holds the promise of shortening the time interval between initial patient collapse and the delivery of the first electrical shock for persons suffering from cardiac arrest, thereby improving the chance of survival. When a cardiac arrest occurs time is critical. The chain of survival depends on the following components:

• early access including the immediate recognition of the emergency and calling 911;
• early intervention including cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
• early defibrillation either through Public Access Defibrillation or by a trained and authorized Public Safety Provider (Ambulance, Fire or Police); and
• advanced cardiac intervention by Advanced Care Paramedics.

Medical Rationale:

"¼ an initial tachyarrythmia causes 80 to 90% of non-traumatic adult cardiac arrests. The goal of early defibrillation is to get a defibrillator to these patients before they deteriorate into a nonviable rhythm, which takes only a few minutes." "¼ defibrillation is the single most important intervention in adult emergency cardiac care". JAMA, 1992;268: p.2215.

The concept of early, rapid defibrillation, clearly endorsed by leading agencies such as the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, Advanced Coronary Treatment (ACT) Foundation of Canada, EMS and Fire Associations and Emergency Physicians, is fairly new in Ontario pre-hospital care. Public Access Defibrillation programs have been established and have proven effective in many communities throughout North America and in Western Canada.

The City of Toronto has a commitment to a highly respected emergency medical services system via universal 911 access, Toronto Ambulance and a tiered response program involving the Toronto Fire and Police Services. This provides a formidable link in the chain of survival, which benefits the community.

Currently ambulances and fire vehicles are equipped with defibrillators and this, combined with the availability of Advanced Care Paramedics, has resulted in improvements in cardiac arrest survival. To further enhance the chain of survival, implementation of public access defibrillation will shorten the time to delivery of first electrical shock. This is particularly important in a highly developed urban environment such as the City of Toronto where first response and Advanced Care Paramedics experience delays in access to patients due to high rise buildings and large public venues.

An assessment of several hundred cardiac arrest cases contained within the Sunnybrook Base Hospital and Toronto Ambulance database indicates that citizen intervention in providing CPR occurs in less than 13% of witnessed cardiac arrest cases. This compares unfavourably to other North American cities where citizen involvement is as high as 80%.

As a "Cardiac Safe City" the City of Toronto must encourage its citizens to become more actively involved in promoting healthy heart activities. One of the ways of doing this is to take CPR training. It has been proven that early recognition and intervention through bystander CPR, combined with early defibrillation, improves survivability and outcome in cardiac arrest situations. Chances of survival decreases by 7-10% for every minute a person waits for treatment. Toronto Ambulance, in conjunction with Sunnybrook and Women’s College Health Sciences Centre, will take a lead roll in promoting greater public awareness and participation in learning CPR. This program would be undertaken in cooperation with the many agencies currently involved in providing CPR training.

These agencies include the Heart and Stroke Foundation, the Advanced Coronary Treatment (ACT) Foundation, St. John Ambulance and the Canadian Red Cross. Increased citizen involvement will provide a solid foundation for future enhancements in community cardiac care such as Public Access Defibrillation.

A recent publication titled "Public Locations of Cardiac Arrest" noted that the 10 locations where there was a higher incidence of cardiac arrest were as follows:

(Source: Becker, Linda, MA (et al.), Public Locations of Cardiac Arrest Implications for Public Access Defibrillation, JAMA 1998;97:2106-2109) Start Up Sites:

It is recommended that City Hall and Nathan Phillips Square proceed as the first site for placement of automatic defibrillators. Implementation of a PAD program at City Hall will set an example for a Cardiac Safe City. This program is intended to encourage other organizations to consider the placement of defibrillators within their facilities and to provide a model for implementation. City Hall will initially be considered a pilot program. Other City of Toronto buildings and locations would be considered following an in-depth analysis of Sunnybrook Base Hospital and Toronto Ambulance’s cardiac arrest database, to determine locations where sudden cardiac arrest is most likely to occur. In addition, consultation with the Medical Officer of Health and cardiac care agencies will provide valuable information for determining potential locations and high-risk target groups that would benefit from public access defibrillation programs within the City.

Advancements in equipment used for defibrillation have facilitated the safe and effective implementation of PAD programs. As a result, it is anticipated there will be rapid expansion in private sector locations where there is high public traffic or areas of potential cardiac risk. It is recommended that Toronto Ambulance and Sunnybrook and Women’s College Health Sciences Centre coordinate the introduction of these programs and create a system to facilitate safe and effective cardiac care in the prehospital environment. This can be achieved in cooperation with the various suppliers and manufacturers of defibrillators and purchaser. Notification of Toronto Ambulance of the location of public access defibrillation programs within the community will establish strong communication within the links in the chain of survival. Medical control is a critical component in the program. Research, outcome monitoring and effective medical control are imperative to establish programs that most effectively serve the communities’ needs.

The initial cost to acquire three automatic defibrillators for the City Hall project is approximately $15,000.00 which, for start up purposes, will be absorbed by Toronto Ambulance in recognition of the potentially significant benefits for cardiac patients, and for the longer term promotion of the program. A preliminary assessment indicates that the placement of a defibrillator in each of the towers and one defibrillator located centrally in the entrance way would be most effective. The cost of training, periodic recertification and medical oversight of this initial City of Toronto program would be provided from existing funds of Toronto Ambulance. Should Council elect to expand the placement of defibrillators in other City of Toronto owned buildings additional program costs would be detailed in a future report. The City of Toronto would not be responsible for any costs for public access defibrillation programs initiated by private organizations in their facilities.

Conclusions:

A pilot PAD project for City Hall and Nathan Phillips Square can be implemented at a relatively low cost. The benefits of a Cardiac Safe City with high rates of citizen CPR and Public Access Defibrillation programs have proven to be valuable to the community. It is anticipated that these initiatives, commencing with the pilot project, will improve the survival rate for patients suffering sudden cardiac arrest outside of the hospital. Toronto Ambulance and Sunnybrook and Women’s College Health Sciences Centre endorse the concept of a Cardiac Safe City, increasing public awareness of the need for citizen CPR, and the implementation of Public Access Defibrillation.

Ronald L. Kelusky

Phone: 397-9240 Fax: 392-2115

4

Impact of Local Telephone Service De-Regulation on the Toronto

The Emergency and Protective Services Committee reports, for the information of Council, having requested the City Clerk, in consultation with the Director of Corporate Access and Privacy, to submit a report to Council when it considers this matter on November 25, 1998.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Emergency and Protective Services Committee endorse recommendations with regard to the impact of local telephone service de-regulation on the Toronto Police Service and request City Council to send a letter to the Federal Minister of Industry indicating such endorsement, the specific recommendations are outlined as follows:

Council Reference/Background History:

At its meeting on September 24, 1998, the Toronto Police Services Board was in receipt of the following report JULY 27, 1998 from David J. Boothby, Chief of Police:

Background:

The use of telephone services by the public has a significant impact upon the police service in two predominant areas; those being incoming emergency 9-1-1 calls, and investigations regarding the origin or content of a telephone call for investigative purposes.

Historically, the Service has dealt with one local telephone service provider, now known as the Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC), which has been Bell Canada. Bell has a lengthy history of working with the police service and has maintained the expertise to manage the provincial Enhanced 9-1-1 network, and the security personnel to manage search warrants.

Local telephone service de-regulation as discussed in Board Minute 301/97 has resulted in the evolution of two new Certified Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC’s) with another four providers anticipated in the Toronto market place by the end of 1999.

Today’s telephone service also extends beyond the traditional "wireline" telephone, to include "wireless" telephone service as provided by cellular, Personal Communications Systems (PCS) and Low Earth Orbit Satellites (LEOS). An ever increasing number of emergency 9-1-1 calls, (approximately 20% to date in 1998) and telephone conversations that are part of a police investigation, are taking place over these "wireless" telephone systems. To date there are 4 major wireless telephone networks, with two additional LEOS networks entering the market place before the end of 1999.

To add to this ever expanding industry are a large group of companies that "re-sell" local telephone service they have purchased from a CLEC. These re-seller companies number in the hundreds across Canada. Re-sellers continue to represent a significant challenge for this Services response to emergencies. The Automatic Location Identification data at the 9-1-1 call centre often displays the name and address of the registered reseller, and not the location where the telephone is located. As a result, emergency crews have been dispatched to the administrative offices of a reselling company for heart attacks, robberies, and assaults without anyone knowing where the real event was occurring.

The Police Service, namely both the 9-1-1 Emergency Call Centre, and Intelligence Services on behalf of the investigative community, are primarily interested in three essential pieces of information:

This information is not standardized across carriers. Local resellers and Wireless Service Providers are not obligated to maintain this information, others do not provide access to it 24 hours a day. Further, there is currently no single point of contact for determining the ownership of all telephone numbers.

In order to look after the interests of the 9-1-1 Emergency Call Centre and the investigative community, significant time and effort has been expended by members of this Service to address issues created by telephone de-regulation.

The Communications E9-1-1 Co-ordinator Chair’s the regional 9-1-1 Committee for Toronto (police, ambulance & fire departments) and sits as Vice-Chair of the Ontario 9-1-1 Advisory Board (information and press releases from whom are contained in Appendix A). She also sits as a participant of the 9-1-1 Sub-Working Group of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Committee (CRTC) representing Ontario, and Co-Chairs the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association E9-1-1 Committee representing Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP’s) nationally. Participation on these committees is undertaken to safeguard the interests of the Service, and to protect against the off-loading of costs to the municipality.

The CLEC Municipal Service Agreement constructed by the Ontario Board members of the E9-1-1 sub-working group, and developed in consultation with Toronto Legal Services, has resulted in the entrenching of quality and service commitments by CLEC’s that will result in savings for Municipalities across the province for administrative and legal expenses while maintaining an superior level of service.

The Electronic Surveillance Co-ordinator for Intelligence Services also sits as a member of the Network Security Sub-Working Group of the CRTC on issues relating to privacy protection and telecommunications interception, and on the Telecommunications Committee of the Criminal Intelligence Service for Ontario. These efforts are undertaken to ensure the police services’ access to information and investigative tools, while also protecting the municipality against the off-loading of costs.

The inconsistency in standards for some wireline and wireless providers, the separation of regulatory controls within Industry Canada, and the CRTC, along with the large number of Federal Acts and Regulations, makes the police services work in this field both difficult and time consuming.

The offices of the Communications E9-1-1 Co-ordinator and the Electronic Surveillance office and Records Unit of Intelligence Services are tasked with this additional work required to operate in this new and evolving telephone environment. This additional work is putting an added strain on the human and financial resources in these units and continued efforts will have to take place to ensure that the negative impact to our Service created by this de-regulation is limited as much as possible.

Although the direct costs associated with CLEC’s was addressed in Board Minute 301/97, and at the Metropolitan Council meeting of 1998.10.8 (Appendix B), the growing human resource expenses associated with this issue are a direct result of actions on the part of the CRTC and the Federal government.

The previous efforts of the Board to prevent a "hard dollar" impact on the Service and the Municipality as a result of new CLEC’s requesting direct connection to the 9-1-1 Network as opposed to the 9-1-1 Centres telephone equipment were successful. As a result of the Boards support of the Provincial 9-1-1 Advisory Boards’ intervention, the resulting procedures for new CLEC’s require their connection to Bell Canada’s 9-1-1 network, which already provides our incoming 9-1-1 calls. This CRTC requirement ensures that the Municipality will not be saddled with the hardware upgrade costs and associated annual operating costs that would ensue, had the Board not been successful. Regardless, we have come to realize that there will continue to be additional human resource required to the meet the demands of dealing with this evolving multiple carrier environment.

In order to alleviate future human resource demands in the records tracking and telephone information management area, the Service is seeking a single point of contact for telephone number information. The CRTC has engaged a trusted third party company to act as the Number Portability Administration Centre (NPAC). This role is being fulfilled by Lockheed-Martin in Canada as well as the United States. The Service foresees the role of the NPAC as being "the keeper of the data" in relation to all wireline and wireless telephones. We are seeking unobstructed automated access to such a database to extract as necessary this information for 9-1-1 calls, and 24 hour a day, 7 day a week access to a contact point for search warrants and telephone interception access.

Failing this, the Service will be forced to take on the responsibility of tracking down subscriber information, addresses, and company information. This will impact upon our ability to provide timely 9-1-1 response, and escalate our human resource costs to secure and manage this information.

While the private sector companies that provide this service have shown their opposition to such a request for a broad number of self-serving reasons, they continue to be content to download the costs for these issues to local municipalities.

Therefore I recommend that the Board request the Federal Minister of Industry develop a mandate for the Number Portability Administration Centre (NPAC) that includes the registration of all wireline and wireless telephone numbers.

Superintendent William Holdridge of Communications Services (local 87709), Communications 9-1-1 Co-ordinator Judy Broomfield of Duty Operations (local 88899) Staff Sergeant James Brown (8-8851) of Duty Operations and Detective Sergeant Doug MacCheyne of Intelligence Services (local 8-3638) will be present to answer any questions on this issue.

Conclusions:

The following persons were in attendance and discussed this issue with the Board:

S/Sgt. James Brown, Duty Operations

Judy Broomfield, Communications 911 Coordinator

D/Sgt. Doug MacCheyne, Intelligence Services

Rick Galway, District Chief, Etobicoke Branch of the City of Toronto Fire Service & Member of the Canadian Executive, National Emergency Number Assoc.

The Board approved the following Motions:

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Staff Sergeant James Brown, Communications Services, Toronto Police Service,

telephone no. (416) 808-8851.

5

Other Items Considered by the Committee

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS FOTINOS,

Chair

Toronto, November 3, 1998